“Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada Revised edition (Book Review)” by J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman by d’Amours, Caroline
Canadian Military History
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 9
11-24-2017
“Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in
Canada Revised edition (Book Review)” by J.L.
Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman
Caroline d’Amours
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
d’Amours, Caroline (2017) "“Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada Revised edition (Book Review)” by J.L.
Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman," Canadian Military History: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss2/9
10 Book Reviews
J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman. Broken Promises: A History of 
Conscription in Canada. Revised edition. Oakville, ON: Rock’s Mills 
Press, 2015. Pp. 282.  
J.L. Granatstein, one of the most prolific Canadian military historians, 
writes in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, 
“[n]o single issue has divided Canadians so sharply as conscription 
for overseas military service in time of war” (p. v). The explosive 
nature of this question, along with the quality of the original book, 
now reissued in a revised form, may explain why historians have 
mostly stayed at arm’s length from this still sensitive political and 
cultural topic. For this, Rock’s Mills Press’ effort to release a new 
edition of this critical work—first published by Oxford University 
Press (Canada)—is to be applauded.
Rather than an overview of the history of conscription from the 
early days of New France up until today, the reader is quickly plunged 
into a more particular study of the politics of conscription for overseas 
service in both World Wars. Using government records and private 
papers of key politicians, Granatstein and the late J.M. Hitsman 
examine conscription through the lens of political history rather 
than a strictly military-oriented analysis. They seek to explain the 
reasons leading to the decision to adopt conscription and measure the 
domestic damage of such a resolution on Canadian unity, especially 
given promises made by Prime Ministers Robert Laird Borden and 
William Lyon Mackenzie King prior to the World Wars that there 
would be no conscription for service overseas. As is well known, these 
promises were made primarily to the considerable French-Canadian 
minority. However, other men and families were keenly interested 
as well: many farmers, non-British immigrants, and other men of 
military age were also less than enthusiastic about compulsory service 
in overseas wars. The authors then turn their attention to Canada’s 
top two political leaders, exploring the deepening pressures that led 
them to reverse course and approve conscription for military service 
overseas, thus breaking key electoral promises and threatening social 
harmony at home during the World Wars. In both conflicts, it was 
the logic of death and heavy casualties, along with slow voluntary 
recruitment, that created important shortages in Canadian infantry 
battalions. The English-speaking majority thought that conscription 
was necessary to keep fighting units at full strength. Yet it was 
also a matter of showing patriotism towards the Imperial “Mother 
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Country,” as well as a way to compel the “disloyal” and “cowardly” 
French Canadians (and others) to share in the highest burden of 
war. Conscription therefore not only sharply divided French and 
English Canadians but also jeopardised the stability of the federal 
government. In return, it had minimal military results since the 
number of conscripts who reached the front in both wars formed 
only a small portion of the Canadian forces. Hence, Granatstein and 
Hitsman conclude correctly that the considerable long-term damage 
done to Canadian political life was not worth the price of compulsory 
service.
Shortage of infantry reinforcements in both wars were partly 
the result of heavy casualties as well as creeping and low voluntary 
enlistments over several years, but other factors were involved. In 
the Great War, much of the blame for the conscription crisis should 
be put on the politicians. In 1917, shortages additionally resulted 
from the pledge of Prime Minister Borden the prior year to raise 
the authorised strength of the Canadian army to 500,000 men. He 
did so intent on an Imperial and Allied commitment in the period of 
heaviest fighting, yet without any idea whether Canada—a country 
with a population of only 7.2  million—had enough manpower to 
sustain such an organisation. Political interference, the disorganised 
voluntary recruiting system established at the outbreak of war by 
Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, and comparably 
inefficient military organisation in Britain, all this did not help. The 
fact that Borden also sought to exploit the issue for political advantage 
in the election of 1917 was disastrous. It would have lasting effects on 
Canadian political life in the next decades. 
In the Second World War, the leading politicians showed they 
had learned some lessons from the First, shifting onto the military 
the weight of responsibility for the manpower shortages that became 
critical in 1944, the great killing year for Western armies only then 
breaching Hitler’s Festung Europa. The Canadian Army—with a 
total force of almost half a million soldiers at the end of 1944—was 
not able to produce the 15,000 trained reinforcements necessary to 
keep its infantry units at full strength. This was partly the result of 
operating in two widely separated theatres, an extensive organisation 
in Britain, and a huge training establishment in Canada. It was 
also the consequence of the decision made by Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King to authorise a greatly enlarged army in 1942, even 
though Canada had already committed to a considerable air force, a 
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significant navy, and an extensive industrial and agricultural effort. 
He did so on the advice of the generals that large field forces could 
be kept at full strength through the voluntary recruiting system. 
The generals were proven wrong once casualties rose with constant 
battle contact with Axis forces. Forced to break his conscription 
promise in November 1944, Mackenzie King was nevertheless able 
to keep the country and his government united. This was due to his 
great political ability and the fact that he really tried to observe his 
promises to French Canada.
Granatstein’s and Hitsman’s original work was a well-written 
and thoroughly researched account, raising expectations for this new 
edition. Unfortunately, the revisions amount to no more than a new 
three-page-long introduction by Granatstein explaining why he does 
not agree with his original conclusions. In the past three decades, he 
turns his attention to the deleterious impact of manpower shortages on 
infantry units in the theatres of active operations. Failure of Canadian 
units to reach set objectives and greater casualties were the cold, hard 
results in the fighting zones. Therefore, Granatstein now believes that 
there was indeed a military necessity to adopt conscription in both 
conflicts, a position he believes most Canadian readers would not 
agree with. While this latest introduction is instructive about the shift 
in one scholar’s views, it does not alter what we already knew about 
the central issue. Indeed, Granatstein had previously worked out this 
position with greater detail in other publications: one chapter in The 
Generals; his article “Conscription and My Politics” in Canadian 
Military History;1 his chapter “Conscription in the Great War” in 
Canada and the First World War;2 and one of his latest books 
the Greatest Victory.3 Consequently, there is nothing fresh, new, 
or additionally important about this purported “third edition” and 
readers familiar with the first and second editions are thus advised to 
keep their loonies in their pockets.
Furthermore, the editing of this new volume is wanting, from 
unwelcome changes to the footnotes that introduce confusion, to 
1  J.L. Granatstein, “Conscription and My Politics,” Canadian Military History 10, No. 4 
(Autumn 2001): 35-38.
2  Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War,” in Canada and the First World War: 
Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, David Mackenzie, ed. (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005): 62-75.
3  Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One Hundred Days, 1918 (Don Mills, 
ON: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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too many misprints and errors in both French and English. This is 
unfortunate. Such shortcomings interfere with the quality and mask 
the importance of the original work, on which serious researchers and 
readers should instead continue to rely.
caroline d’amours, royal canadian military college of canada 
and boston university
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